Methods & data

What the tool measures

This guide explains how to read the tool’s estimates of Canadian workforce exposure to U.S. import tariffs across 33 industry clusters, all 13 provinces and territories, and all 293 census divisions. Formal model equations, elasticity specifications and concordances are documented in the companion IRPP Technical Note.

Two measures
  1. Jobs dependent on goods exported to the United States: jobs tied to producing Canadian goods for U.S. buyers, regardless of tariffs.
  2. Jobs at risk from U.S. tariffs: jobs tied to exports predicted to be lost as U.S. buyers switch suppliers or buy less because of tariff-induced price increases.

Each measure is reported as a share of local employment and as job-equivalents, anchored to employed workers in the 2021 Census of Population (by place of residence). Job-equivalents sum fractional export dependence across workers — for example, 10 workers whose jobs each depend 10% on U.S.-bound goods count as one job-equivalent. (Job-equivalents do not predict layoffs; see What the tool doesn’t measure.) National and provincial or territorial views report both Direct jobs in goods-exporting industries and Direct + suppliers (adding upstream Canadian workers supplying inputs and services to those exporters); census division views report direct jobs only.

Counts below 10,000 are rounded to two significant figures, and counts of 10,000 or more to the nearest 1,000. Four census divisions with fewer than 1,000 employed workers are still ranked in Explore, flagged with a small tag and excluded from headline “up to” community highs.

What the tool doesn’t measure

Exposure is not a forecast of layoffs. Firms may absorb part of a tariff in margins, renegotiate contracts, trim hours or weather temporary duties without cutting staff — or, conversely, concentrated sales losses can idle an entire shift or plant. Job-equivalents measure how much export-tied work faces U.S. tariff pressure under fixed economic relationships, not individual layoffs or unemployment.
  • Workforce changes since 2021 and daily commuting. Local employment comes from the 2021 Census — the latest public source with consistent four-digit industry counts across all 293 census divisions — paired with 2024 export weights. Subsequent plant closures (such as the 2025 auto assembly closure in Ingersoll, Oxford County, Ontario), expansions or post-2021 workforce shifts are not reflected. Because census employment is recorded by place of residence, commuters are counted where they live rather than where their plant is located.
  • Firm-specific export shares and local supply chains. Within each province or territory, communities are assigned the same industry-level export dependence, tariff loss rates and product mix as the province as a whole, while differing in the mix of industries that make up their local workforce (2021 Census). Provincial averages therefore understate exposure in towns whose plants ship almost exclusively to the United States and overstate exposure in towns in the same industry that serve mainly domestic or overseas buyers. Upstream supplier jobs (Direct + suppliers) cross municipal boundaries and are not allocated to census divisions.
  • Direct service exports, retaliation, currency moves and trade rerouting. Direct service exports face no U.S. customs duty and are outside scope (though Canadian service workers supplying domestic goods exporters are included in Direct + suppliers). Canadian counter-tariffs and exchange rates are held constant, and lost U.S. sales are not offset by rerouting exports to non-U.S. markets — an important distinction between globally traded commodities (such as crude oil, aluminum or potash) and specialized North American manufacturers.

How the tool works

Starting from individual U.S. tariff lines, the tool estimates how tariff increases since January 2025 reduce product exports, maps those losses to provincial industries and upstream suppliers, and allocates direct exposure across local workforces:

1. From product tariffs to provincial industry sales

U.S. import tariffs raise prices for American buyers, who may switch to untariffed foreign suppliers, turn to U.S.-made alternatives, or buy less overall. Combining historical price-sensitivity estimates with how much U.S. buyers rely on Canadian and global imports gives a predicted percentage drop in U.S. sales for each tariffed product. Those product-level drops are then weighted by recent export patterns into 163 industry groups — built from four-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and Statistics Canada input-output industries — separately for each province and territory.

2. From industry sales to direct and supplier jobs

Multiplying each province-by-industry workforce (2021 Census) by the share of its jobs directly tied to U.S. goods exports (2022 Statistics Canada Value Added in Exports) gives jobs dependent on goods exported to the United States. Multiplying those jobs by the industry’s predicted export drop then gives direct jobs at risk from U.S. tariffs.

At the national and provincial or territorial levels, Direct + suppliers uses provincial input-output tables to add upstream Canadian workers who supply materials, parts, freight and services to goods exporters. For display in Explore, the 163 four-digit NAICS-based groups are combined into 33 industry clusters (25 goods-exporting clusters and eight upstream supplier clusters, which appear when Direct + suppliers is selected).

3. From provincial industries to 293 census divisions

Because customs records do not track municipal trade, each province’s direct job-equivalents are distributed across its census divisions in proportion to local 2021 Census employment in each four-digit NAICS industry. The resulting census-division estimates add up to the original provincial total. Although communities within a province share each industry’s percentage loss rate, local workforce exposure varies widely depending on how heavily a community relies on exposed industries.

Full methodology: Complete six-stage equations, trade-elasticity and market-share formulas, industry concordances and modelling assumptions are detailed in the companion IRPP Technical Note. An interactive number-by-number walkthrough (Trace) is coming soon.

Range, snapshots and scenarios

Because actual border duty collections and U.S. buyer switching in integrated North American supply chains are uncertain — especially in the short run relative to medium-run trade estimates — jobs at risk from U.S. tariffs are presented as a range between two bounds. The high-end estimate pairs statutory tariff rates (net of CUSMA claiming) with empirical buyer-switching elasticities. The low-end estimate pairs observed customs duties collected (where published) with minimal buyer switching.

This range reflects how sensitive the results are to these modelling assumptions, rather than a statistical confidence interval. Estimates of jobs dependent on goods exported to the United States reflect pre-tariff trade and are identical at both ends.

September 2026 default view: U.S. Census customs duty collection records are not yet published for the September 2026 schedule. In September 2026 — and under policy scenarios — both ends use statutory tariff rates, differing only in buyer-switching sensitivity and container-specific import bans. Consequently, the September 2026 low end is not directly comparable over time to the collected-duty low end of the June 2025–June 2026 snapshots (and will update once autumn 2026 customs data are released); the historical timeline on Explore therefore compares snapshots at the high end. Relative community rankings are nearly identical at both ends (0.98 rank correlation across census divisions).

Comparison of assumptions at the high end and low end of the exposure range
Model inputHigh endLow end
Tariff rates Statutory U.S. rates (adapted for Canada from The Budget Lab at Yale’s tariff-rate tracker), net of Canadian CUSMA claiming shares (~95% export-weighted average) and Section 232 content relief Effective duties collected in U.S. Census import records, plus anti-dumping and countervailing duties (AD/CVD), capped at statutory rates; statutory rates where customs records are not yet published (September 2026 and scenarios)
U.S. buyer switching Empirical switching estimates: steeper product-level switching on Canada-specific tariffs (Fontagné et al., 2022) and milder industry-level switching toward U.S. producers on tariffs hitting most countries (Riker, 2025) Minimal switching sensitivity (unit elasticity of 1.0, capped so the low end never exceeds the high end)
Import bans (September 2026) All 97 listed 10-digit Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS-10) lines banned outright or in specified containers 68 HTS-10 lines banned outright or in consumer containers (excludes bans limited to containers over four litres or unspecified sizes)
Held constant at both ends Full tariff pass-through to U.S. buyer prices; unit U.S. industry demand sensitivity; 2022 U.S. market shares; 2024 export weights; 2022 export employment shares; and 2021 Census employed workforce

Snapshots of U.S. tariffs in force

Every snapshot is measured relative to January 2025 (first row below): only tariffs added or increased since January 2025 count toward jobs at risk (for instance, in softwood lumber, At risk reflects duty increases above the pre-existing 14.4% U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) baseline).

Policy scenarios on Explore

The Policy scenario menu on Explore tests subsequent tariff changes and counterfactuals against Latest (September 2026) at the active end of the range, holding 2024 trade weights and 2021 Census employment fixed:

  • Oct. 30 Section 338 tariff swap (preliminary estimates): models the October 23, 2026, proclamation (effective October 30) removing 22 eight-digit HTS subheadings from the 50% Section 338 tariff (lowering exposure in plastics, rubber and machinery) while adding 100 subheadings of roughly US$2.5 billion in trade each way (at 50%, or 46.4% on civil-aircraft-eligible chest freezers), mapped ahead of formal U.S. schedule publication.
  • Jan. 1, 2027 threat: 50% auto, truck & steel: raises statutory Section 232 rates on passenger vehicles, light and heavy trucks, buses, auto parts, and steel, aluminum and copper derivatives to a 50% floor while keeping current CUSMA claiming shares and U.S.-content relief in place.
  • CUSMA exemptions removed: keeps existing U.S. tariff statutes unchanged while setting CUSMA duty-free claiming from ~95% of exports to 0%, exposing previously compliant shipments to the 10% global Section 301 tariff, Section 232 automotive and metal duties, and regular most-favoured-nation (MFN) rates on the books.
  • Universal 10% tariff (no CUSMA): replaces all post-January 2025 U.S. tariff increases and Section 338 import bans with an unexempted 10% multilateral tariff across all Canadian goods (keeping January 2025 baseline MFN, Section 201 and AD/CVD duties; shown under Other tariff changes in Explore).

Why energy and manufacturing regions move in opposite directions: Under CUSMA exemptions removed, exposure jumps in CUSMA-reliant manufacturing, agri-food and seafood, yet crude oil, natural gas, electricity and potash barely move because they carry zero (or near-zero) regular U.S. MFN duty and are carved out of the 10% Section 301 tariff. Conversely, under Universal 10% tariff (no CUSMA), previously duty-free energy and resource exports newly face a 10% tariff. This lifts exposure in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland and Labrador. At the same time, replacing 25%–50% Section 232, Section 338 and lumber duties with a 10% tariff lowers exposure in heavily tariffed manufacturing and forestry communities.

Data sources and vintages

The table below summarizes the primary data layers entering the tool and their vintages (the reference year or period each dataset reflects).

Summary of primary data sources and vintages
ComponentPrimary sourcesVintage
U.S. tariffs, CUSMA claiming and collected duties The Budget Lab at Yale’s tariff-rate tracker (adapted with Canada-specific AD/CVD, stacking rules and proclamations); U.S. Census Bureau monthly imports by tariff program and customs duty collections January 2025 baseline – October 2026
Merchandise export and tariff-line weights Statistics Canada Canadian International Merchandise Trade (provincial domestic exports to the U.S. by HS-6); U.S. Census Bureau imports from Canada (HTS-10 weights) 2024
Export employment shares and domestic supply chains Statistics Canada Value Added in Exports (Table 12-10-0100-01), Provincial Supply and Use Tables (Table 36-10-0478-01), IOIC–NAICS concordance, and authors’ HS-6–to–SUT concordance 2022
Local workforce by industry Statistics Canada Census of Population employed workforce by four-digit NAICS and census division of residence (Table 98-10-0592-01) 2021
Buyer-switching and U.S. market-share parameters Fontagné, Guimbard & Orefice (2022); Riker (2025); Hallren & Riker (2017); U.S. Census Bureau bilateral trade and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis industry gross output 2022 market shares; published elasticity estimates

Full dataset tables, classification concordances and bibliographic references are provided in the IRPP Technical Note.

About, citing and downloads

Preliminary release: Core national, provincial and community estimates (Home, Explore and Methods & data) are publicly available while four additional workbench views (Compare, Tariffs, Trace and Scenario Lab) and bulk data downloads are finalized. The companion IRPP Technical Note is being finalized for publication alongside the tool and is available on request in the interim. Questions, comments and feedback are welcome at rchejfec@irpp.org (or for media inquiries, at tduboyce@irpp.org).

This interactive tool was published as part of the IRPP’s Defying Gravity: Diversifying Canada’s Trade research program. Editorial and methodological text was copy-edited by Prasanthi Vasanthakumar and Paul Carlucci, proofreading was by Maya Lach-Aidelbaum and the header graphic was created by Anne Tremblay.

Ricardo Chejfec is a research director at the IRPP, leading the Empowering Canada’s Workforce research program.

Jacob Greenspon is a research manager at the Harvard Kennedy School and a research advisor at the IRPP.

Wenshuang Yu is a postdoctoral scholar at the University of Calgary and a postdoctoral research fellow at the IRPP.

How to cite and reuse

Media and reuse: Journalists, researchers and policymakers may reproduce or adapt estimates, maps and charts from this tool with credit and a link to tariffs.irpp.org.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank IRPP vice-president of research Rachel Samson for her guidance and review throughout this project. The authors also thank Georges Rigas for research assistance and Ricardo Montrose for coordinating the IRPP web and technical infrastructure for this release.

Large language models and AI coding assistance tools were used to generate candidate product mappings for the Harmonized System–to–Supply-and-Use concordance and to support software development, verification scripts and editorial drafting for this tool. All concordances, generated code and outputs were verified and tested by the authors, who take full responsibility for the output.

Downloads and reproducibility

  • IRPP Technical Note (PDF): formal equations, elasticity specifications, concordances and references forthcoming · available on request
  • Downloadable data tables (CSV / Parquet): estimates by place, industry, snapshot and scenario to come
  • Release changelog: summary of tariff-schedule and data updates to come